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1. INTRODUCTION
As businesses become increasingly international in scope
the ethical challenges of commerce grow more complex.1
Globalization of markets results in greater diversity among
corporate stakeholders. This diversity takes a number of
forms, including a more eclectic workforce, more heterogeneous
suppliers, and more varied clusters of consumers.' A
consequence of cultural diversification is increased exposure to
a greater variety of values, norms, and beliefs. Within this
context3 ethical decisionmaking becomes more complicated
and potentially more difficult."
*Associate Professor, University of Texas at Austin; B.A., Hofstra
University; M.A., Dartmouth College; J.D., The College of William and
Mary; M.A., Ph.D., The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.
' For a discussion of ethical and public policy challenges arising from the
internationalization of business, see RAYMOND J. WALDMANN, REGULATING
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS THROUGH CODES OF CONDUCT 5-18 (1980).
2 While this article focuses on the challenges of international business
ethics, these issues are a subcategory within the broader class of
international ethics. For a comprehensive general overview ofinternational
ethics, see TERRY NARDIN & DAVID R. MAPEL, TRADITIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL ETHICS (1992).
' This is particularly true for the growing numbers of smaller firms that
lack the specialized and highly trained personnel most capable of
recognizing and analyzing complicated ethical problems. See Michael A.
Mayo, Ethical Problems Encountered by U.S. Small Businesses in
International Marketing, J. SMALL Bus. MGMT., Jan. 1991, at 51, 57.
" For discussion of the effects of complexity on difficulty in
decisionmaking, see generally PAUL C. NUTT, MAKING TOUGH DECISIONS:
TACTICS FOR IMPROVING MANAGERIAL DECISIONMAKING (1989).
(327)
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Because the norms that define the limits of acceptable
behavior are often culturally derived, greater diversity is likely
to result in greater conflict between cultural norms. On a
spectrum ranging from cohesive cultures to mixed or
heterogeneous cultures, norm consensus moves from high to
low. With the internationalization of the marketplace in the
1990s businesses can expect to encounter greater cultural
diversity and less concordance of values among stakeholders.
As a result, ethical decisions likely will become more
challenging.5
In addition to the challenges presented by cultural
diversity,' the potential disparity of interests between nations
at varying stages of development affects international business
ethics.' For example, recent discussions concerning free trade
including the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)
and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have
raised ethical and public policy questions about the fair
distribution of costs and benefits between developed and
developing economies.' Given the powerful force of
multinational corporations (MNCs) in shaping the substance
of international agreements, these issues are of particular
importance to corporations attuned to the ethical implications
of their decisions and actions.' GATT and NAFTA will alter
' See, e.g., David J. Fritzsche, Emerging Ethical Issues in International
Business, SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J., Autumn 1990, at 42,43-45 (identifying
ethical issues likely to arise from the integration of economic markets).
' For a discussion of these challenges, see GERARD ELFSTROM, MORAL
ISSUES AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1991).
" While discussions of MNCs in the Third World often affect a Marxist
critical posture regarding ostensibly imperialist motives and behaviors, the
discussion of ethics in this setting probably benefits from a balanced and
realistic assessment of host-country attitudes. As Donaldson observes,
"Third World representatives increasingly acknowledge the role
multinationals play as a conduit of technological know-how to host cultures,
and most have adopted a promultinational position .... " Thomas
Donaldson, Can Multinationals Stage a Universal Morality Play?, 29 Bus.
& Soc. REV. 51, 52 (1992). Balancing this observation is the recognition
that "[b]ecause they are powerful, the multinationals possess formidable
moral responsibilities." Id.
8 See, e.g., John Dobson, TNCs and the Corruption of GATT. Free Trade
Versus Fair Trade, 12 J. Bus. ETHICS 573 (1993) [hereinafter Dobson,
TNCsJ; Ross A. McDonald, An Open Letter to North American Business
Ethicists, 12 J. Bus. ETHICS 661 (1993).
' See John Dobson, Ethics in the Transnational Corporation: The "Moral
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relations between First World and Third World nations,"0 and
thus provide the potential for the development and
exploitation of Third World countries.' MNCs conducting
business in developing and newly-opened economies face
considerations of fair dealing with historically disadvantaged
economies as well as the challenge of increased complexity
that arises from intercultural heterogeneity.
2
The variety of perspectives that accompanies the
globalization of business has two crucial effects. First, inbred
or myopic philosophies are exposed to the challenging eye of
different viewpoints, thus enhancing the likelihood that
traditional assumptions will be questioned and dysfunctional
practices will be scrutinized. Second, harmony and consensus
likely will be disrupted, and conflicts among cultures may
become a source of relational disruption and dissension.
These tendencies are the source of a debate concerning how
Buck" Stops Where?, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 21, 24 (1992) [hereinafter Dobson,
Ethics]("The most powerful interest group present for [the review of GATT]
is... a consortium of the world's TNCs. It is not surprising, therefore, that
GATT's primary agenda appears to be the facilitation of unencumbered
development of the developing world by the developed world's TNCs.").
i" The recent focus of government policy on international business
relations in general, and such relations with developing nations specifically,
suggests that corporate approaches to international ethics will be
inextricably tied to related phenomena such as business-government
relations, voluntary responsibility versus mandatory accountability, and the
development of international public policy. For discussion of these related
concerns, see Sita C. Amba-Rao, Multinational Corporate Social
Responsibility, Ethics, Interactions and Third World Governments: An
Agenda for the 1990s, 12 J. Bus. ETHICS 553 (1993).
" For an ethical analysis of Third World development, see David A.
Crocker, Toward Development Ethics, 19 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 457 (1991);
IRMA ADELMAN & CYNTHIA T. MORRIS, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND SOCIAL
EQUITY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIEs (1973); David A. Crocker, Insiders and
Outsiders in International Development Ethics, 5 ETHICS & INT'L AFFAIRS
411 (1991).
" Reference to this component of international business does not imply
that this author intends to take a particular position. Proponents of free
trade will argue that open markets redound to the benefit of all, whereas
opponents of free trade will refer to the purported opportunities and
realities of exploitation that arise when powerful companies from First
World economies enter into transactions with less powerful companies from
Third World economies. Instead, the purpose of this Article is to identify
both the reality of more open trade in the 1990s, and the ethical and policy
challenges that face MNCs as they assess various business opportunities
and render decisions that may be criticized as exploitative.
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to resolve ethical tensions that arise in international business.
This Article addresses the literature and makes several
recommendations regarding the regulation of international
business ethics. Specifically, this Article suggests that (1)
resolution of international business ethics dilemmas focuses
too much on result and not enough on process and the benefits
that can be derived from effective processes; (2) as a result,
calls for increased international codification of business ethics,
whether by international laws and treaties or by international
professional" or industry codes, must be carefully
circumscribed to avoid the establishment of consensus at the
cost of colloquy; and (3) this circumscription can be effectively
achieved by utilizing "voluntary codes,"' 4 which serve as
intermediate bridges between the organic development of
community values and the official embodiment of such values
in enforceable "true codes."' 5
Section Two discusses the nature of codes of ethics and
explores the circumstances under which such codes can be
dysfunctional, especially in international applications.
Community, including community values, is defined as a
function of process rather than as a substantive entity. This
focus on legitimately derived and effective community
development processes establishes the foundation for Section
Three, which attempts to reconcile the interests of community
"s This Article primarily addresses questions of international business
ethics rather than professional ethics. Most of the concepts, however, also
may be applied to the professions. This Article's emphasis upon colloquy
and discourse over rigid application of rules in complex international and
cross-cultural contexts is apt as applied to the professions. As one
commentator observed about the practice of international law, "lilt is wrong
to think that the way to regulate the conduct of lawyers is to create a single
approach that applies to all lawyers in all contexts." Robert E. Lutz, Ethics
and International Practice: A Guide to the Professional Responsibilities of
Practitioners, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 53, 86 (1992-93).
" For further discussion of the term "voluntary code," see infra notes
109-14 and accompanying text.
16 For the purposes of this Article, enforceability is the definitive quality
of a "true code." For purposes of reference, the reader can assume that the
terms "true code" and "code" are interchangeable. Any references to
"voluntary codes" will be consistently so labelled.
Because the existence of a code is contingent upon enforceability, a code
is a form of law which derives its quality of compulsion from some source of
power. For a discussion of law as power, see Austin T. Turk, Law as a
Weapon in Social Conflict, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 105, 107-113 (William
M. Evan ed., 1980).
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and expediency, recommending the use of voluntary codes to
bridge the gap between the establishment of value consensus
and ripeness for true codification.
2. THE DYNAMICS OF CODES VERSUS COLLOQUIA
IN EMERGENT COMMUNITIES
This Section identifies the ways in which codes of ethics
differ from ethics developed in a more informal, organic, and
gradual manner through the process of facilitated discourse or
colloquy." This author suggests that codes of behavior are
dysfunctional when adopted prior to adequate community
development. The problem is particularly compelling in the
context of the global marketplace, within which transactions
and relationships frequently arise prior to an opportunity for
the mutual examination of expectations and ideals." As a
" Reference to colloquy as "organic" is intended to evoke the image of a
naturally emerging ethics, as compared to a forced or compelled ethics. This
emphasis is of course hardly new; rather, it reflects the historic emphasis
in Western political philosophy on free and open discourse in a marketplace
of ideas as the optimal forum for the development of rules and standards
concerning the inevitably social nature of humankind. See, e.g., JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 75-118 (Penguin Classics 1974) (1859).
" The development of community during the late twentieth century
poses novel and unprecedented challenges. Our first impulse may be to
argue that community has been a challenge since human beings began to
live as social beings, i.e., since the inception of history. Upon closer
examination, however, the present period is revealed to present unique
problems in establishing community standards of morality.
Prior to the industrial revolution, the geographic sphere of social living
was highly restricted, largely by limitations in transportation,
communication, and technology in general. In other words, interactions
were limited to relatively small numbers of intra- and inter-group
combinations. Even during the industrial revolution, trade was far more
limited than it is today, and collaborative arrangements, joint ventures, and
contractual or licensing arrangements occurred with less frequency and over
a less varied network of possible connections.
As advances in transportation, communication, and technology facilitate
greater interactive possibilities, and as political economies move toward
greater economic freedom, the potential for global relationships expands.
Geography is thus rapidly approaching irrelevance, both in terms of alliance
activity and sales/service transaction relationships. As geography
approaches logistical irrelevance, culture remains entrenched and
intransigent. Businesses in the emerging global market therefore must
recognize that loyalties to cultural norms and values cannot necessarily
evolve and converge to one global ideal as rapidly as technology permits the
development of new relationships.
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result, the encouragement of colloquy is crucial to the
development of effective transnational business ethics.
This Section first examines the nature of ethical codes in
terms of their definitive and incidental characteristics. The
discussion focuses specifically on the goal of clarity as it is
constrained and limited by cross-cultural contexts prior to
unified community evolution. These constraints often lead to
vague code provisions. As a result, many codes, especially
those that precede the development of a community vision, are
of little practical use. The discussion focuses on the difficulty
of promulgating an international code without an adequately
defined global community. A detailed example illustrates the
difficulties attendant to the provision of specific ethical edicts
in the absence of universal moral principles.
2.1. The Definitive and Incidental Characteristics of Codes
of Ethics.
A code is a "collection, compendium or revision of laws,
" i s
a "complete system of positive law, scientifically arranged, and
promulgated by legislative authority."9 Framers of a code
strive to create an instrument that is binding, comprehensive,
and authoritarian. These qualities are common to existing
ethical and professional codes. Because codes are created by
legislative authority, a fundamental and definitive quality of
any code is that it is binding in nature. In contrast, the
comprehensiveness of codes is an ideal rather than a definitive
quality. A code can embody some instead of all rules of
behavior. A code that is not binding on its constituency is not
a true code; rather, it is a proposed set of ideal values.
Because this Article examines the difference between legalistic
compulsion and nonbinding discourse during the early
evolutionary stages of global community, a literal definition of
the term code is necessary for comparative purposes.
Transnational codes2" with a moral dimension 2' may be
Is BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 323 (4th ed. 1968).
"kL
' The corporate code of ethics began largely as an American
phenomenon, and has only recently gained increased attention in other
nations. See Bruce N. Kaye, Codes of Ethics in Australian Business
Corporations, 11 J. Bus. ETHICs 857 (1992) (observing that corporate codes
are a more recent phenomenon in Australia than in the United States).
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private or public." In either case, they are embodiments of
law in the broadest sense, because they are enforceable by a
source of control.2 Private codes are imposed by privately
owned entities, e.g., business corporations and professional
firms. Because the power to grant rewards for compliance and
to mete sanctions for disobedience is lodged in the
bureaucratic structure of private entities, private codes are
essentially legalistic."' Codes promulgated at the
organizational level are typically top-down documents that
form the basis of bureaucratic and administrative control.2 5
" In this Article, codes containing a moral dimension differ from codes
that contain exclusively policy dimensions. Codes in the latter category
embody a choice among several possible policy decisions that cannot be
distinguished from an ethical perspective, which must be made for purposes
such as expedience, consistency, and order.
1 A public code is enforceable by the power of the state, as opposed to a
private code which is enforceable by a private entity such as an employer-
corporation, a professional employer, or a professional accrediting body.
2S Implicit in this statement is a liberal interpretation of the "legislative
authority" that is the source of true codes. See supra note 15. Given this
Article's purpose of distinguishing compulsory standards from organically
developing standards, it is useful to define the authoritative sources of codes
broadly, to include rules derived from both government and private loci of
control.
24 For critics who may suggest a distinction between governmentally
legislated edicts and corporate standards that are technically derived from
employment contracts, a number of explanatory comments may be helpful
here. First, the contractual source of compliance with corporate rules does
not necessarily distinguish corporate mandates from governmental
mandates; to the contrary, the ultimate source of government authority in
republican society is a form of contract, albeit typically labelled a social
contract. Accordingly, government and corporate rules cannot be
distinguished by labelling the latter as contractual. The most compelling
basis for distinguishing the social contract that legitimizes governmental
authority from the private contract that condones corporate authority is the
relatively greater degree to which the former may be viewed as adhesive in
nature, given the impracticability of declining to participate in society at
large. Even this potential schism between public and private edict is
becoming increasingly illusory, as corporations grow to resemble states in
terms of the dimension of power, and to the extent that large employers
have substantially greater bargaining power than employees.
" Even when corporations elicit substantial input from employees at all
organizational levels in developing a code of ethics, the ultimate authority
rests at the top of the hierarchy. Thus, even relatively emergent codes that
reflect significant bottom-up contributions are ultimately instruments of
legal compulsion. They are distinguishable from more autocratic codes of
ethics only in that they are laws that are likely to have more democratic
influences; be they autocratic or democratic, they are still laws.
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
Professional codes are not easily classified as either public
or private. All professional codes can be considered at least
"quasi-public" because of the potential influence they have
upon the force of legal judgments in the course of litigation.
Moreover, failure to comply with the dictates of influential
accrediting associations can be tantamount to professional
ostracism. To the extent that states adopt accrediting body
standards as law, those standards become public codifications.
The American Medical Association's Principles of Medical
Ethics and Current Opinions of the Judicial Council (AMA
Principles),2" for example, are not laws per se, and the
maximum penalty for violation of the principles is expulsion
from the AMA. Nonetheless, the AMA Principles' ethical
precepts serve as persuasive evidence of the existence of
threshold professional standards. Likewise, the American Bar
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility serves two
quasi-public legalistic functions: it provides evidence of
professional standards of loyalty and care, and it becomes
directly enforceable public law when a state adopts it or its
variants as binding upon lawyers admitted to practice within
that state.
Members of a corporate community are bound coercively by
private codes, much as citizens of a state are bound by public
codes of law,28 i.e., formalized laws of either sovereignties or
alliances of sovereignties. International public codes of ethics
are typically in the form of compacts or treaties. Examples of
international public codes of ethics2" are The Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises adopted by the European
2 6 AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, CURRENT OPINIONS OF THE JUDICIAL
COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (1981) (supplement to
the revised Principles of Medical Ethics adopted at the Annual Convention
of the American Medical Association in 1980).
237 See, e.g., TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
(1992).
28 The binding nature of private codes can be viewed contractually-just
as citizens in a republican state become bound under some variant of social
contract, citizens of the corporation are bound by agreement to abide by the
corporation's rules, regulations, and mandatory standards. For a more
detailed explication, see supra note 24.
2 For the purposes of this Article, a true code is defined as obligatory
and enforceable. These examples fall within such a definition because they
are either directly enforceable by the promulgating authority or indirectly
enforceable upon adoption by sovereign governing bodies.
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD Guidelines"),30 The International Labour Office
Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational
Enterprises and Social Policy ("Tripartite Declaration"),3 ' and
the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations."
2.2. Difficulties Associated with. Codification in International
Contexts.
Codification of values can be troublesome under any
circumstances, but it raises particular difficulties in
international and intercultural contexts. The remainder of
this Section addresses the problems associated with codes
under conditions of social, legal, and cultural heterogeneity.
2.2.1. The Misguided Goal of Legal Clarity
The term "legal clarity" implies that notice of compulsory
expectations be unambiguous. The utility of legal clarity is
limited by language and culture within international contexts.
Thus, under conditions of great heterogeneity, analytical or
"ethical" clarity is more valuable than a precise explication of
mandatory expectations.
Clarity has value in the realm of ethics, but that value
" OECD, Declaration by the Governments of OECD Member Countries
and Decisions of the OECD Council on Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprise, adopted June 21, 1976; amended 1979, 1984. The OECD
Guidelines are only partially true codes, as they contain both binding and
voluntary provisions. For a discussion of the OECD Guidelines, see OECD
DECLARATION ON INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT AND MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISES, 1991 REVIEw (OECD Publications, 1992).
"1 International Labour Office Governing Body §§ 185-214. The
Tripartite Declaration is akin to a uniform code that is made enforceable
when individual home countries adopt its provisions as law. Hans Gunter
of the International Labor Office notes, "Governments are urged by the
Declaration to ratify certain basic relevant ILO Conventions in the areas of
freedom of association, collective bargaining and non-discrimination in
employment, where they have not been ratified...." Hans Gunter, The
Tripartite Declaration of Principles concerning Multinational Enterprises
and Social Policy (History, contents, follow-up and relationship with relevant
instruments of other organisations), ILO Working Paper # 18 at 5 (1992).
32 UNITED NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, THE
UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS,
U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/4 (1986).
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differs from the value of clarity in law. Ethical clarity is the
clarity of philosophers, an illumination of normative
expectations through the vehicle of reason and the process of
logical ordering. In this sense, ethical clarity refers to the
ability to maintain the highest quality of conversation. The
dialectic of an ethics is served by arguments that build on
sound axioms, and that proceed in a reasonable and
intellectually supportable progression."8
Clarity in law is achieved when the rules of the game are
delineated in the most precise and certain terms. 4 The valid
and valuable objective of legal clarity is due process-the
promise that the rules will be binding on the players only if
their application imparts a fundamentally fair imposition of
authority. This quality of legal clarity is the opposite of
ethical clarity. Whereas legal clarity is an attempt to fix
expectations and understandings, ethical clarity is the effort
to sustain rational discourse and encourage justified alteration
in thinking.
International contexts, characterized by social and cultural
diversity, are imbued with layers of ethical complexity above
and beyond the complexity of ethics in more homogeneous
" Contrast the potential anti-colloquial effects of codes. Kultgen
describes the "moral inversion" that can result from the codification process:
Ethical persons reflect on actions that are clearly right or clearly
wrong and generalize principles for difficult cases. They formulate
codes that carry moral authority. Society recognizes the value of
actions promoted by the code and rewards them. The actions come
to be performed by morally insouciant individuals for the sake of
the rewards. Others find that they can gain the rewards by only
appearing to conform to the code or, more deviously, by insinuating
self-serving provisions into the code itself.
John Kultgen, The Ideological Use of Professional Codes, Bus. & PROF.
ETHICS J., Spring 1982, at 53, 64.
"' As sociological functionalists have revealed, the law's goal of clarity is
constrained by the inevitable qualities of interpretation. See, e.g., Talcott
Parsons, The Law and Social Control, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 60, 62
(William M. Evan ed., 1980). Parsons explains:
[R]ules must be formulated in general terms. The general statement
may not cover all of the circumstances of the particular situation in
which I am placed. Or there may be two or more rules, the implications
of which for my action are currently contradictory. Which one applies
and in what degree and in what way? What specifically are my
obligations in this particular situation or my rights under the law? This
is the problem of interpretation.
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settings."5 This complexity begins with substantial variation
in the significance placed on business ethics, and therefore on
the likelihood that particular activities will even trigger the
process of moral analysis. Vogel refers to the disparity in
ethical engagement as the "ethics gap,"8 the existence of
which has been confirmed in comparative analyses between
the United States and such countries as Australia 7 and
Great Britain."8
Even when there is a parity between nations or cultures in
regard to ethical engagement, complexity nonetheless results
from the increased variance among values and norms in
transactions and interactions between distinctive cultures. '
This complexity is a compelling force for ethical relativists and
nonrelativists alike.40  For ethical relativists,4 ' cross-
ss For a detailed discussion of the margin of complexity conferred by
culture and language in international relations, see Steven R. Salbu,
Parental Coordination and Conflict in International Joint Ventures: The
Use of Contract to Address Legal, Linguistic, and Cultural Concerns, 43
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1221 (1993).
" David Vogel, The Globalization of Business Ethics: Why America
Remains Distinctive, 35 CAL. MGMT. REv. 30, 35-36 (1992) ("By any
available measure, the level of public, business, and academic interest in
issues of business ethics in the United States far exceeds that in any other
capitalist country.").
7 See Kaye, supra note 20, at 859-60.
See Jack Mahoney, An International Look at Business Ethics: Britain,
9 J. Bus. ETHICS 545, 545 (1990) ("British business ethics is still only in its
infancy."); Thomas W. Whipple & Dominic F. Swords, Business Ethics
Judgments:A Cross-Cultural Comparison, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 671, 676 (1992)
(finding "U.S. [questionnaire] respondents are significantly more critical
than U.K." respondents along several dimensions of ethical decisionmaking).
s For example, White and Rhodeback identified significant differences
in the ways in which U.S. and Taiwanese subjects viewed the ethical
characteristics of such problems as "misrepresentation, value/goal conflicts,
manipulation, technical ineptness and misuse of data." Louis P. White &
Melanie J. Rhodeback, Ethical Dilemmas in Organization Development: A
Cross-Cultural Analysis, 12 J. Bus. ETHICS 663, 668 (1992).
", While this paper addresses the differences between ethical relativism
and absolutism only incidentally, the common utility of colloquy for both
relativists and absolutists may shed light on the controversy between these
two conflicting camps. Werhane has demonstrated that relativist and
absolutist perspectives must ultimately clash in the application. See
Patricia H. Werhane, Ethical Relativism and Multinational Corporations,
in BUSINESS ETHICS: CORPORATE VALUES AND SOCIETY 145, 146 (Milton
Snoeyenbos et al., eds., 1983). This observation is true, given the manner
in which ethical relativism is usually defined, i.e., to suggest that value
judgments "are context-bound, relevant only to the particular socio-cultural
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cultural complexity is certainly daunting. Before divergent
ethical systems may be reconciled, a discussion between
proponents of such systems must reach a high level of
refinement at which the cultural contexts of valuation can be
explained and reasonably understood. Similarly, for
nonrelativists, values believed to transcend national and
cultural borders must be derived, evaluated, and periodically
re-evaluated. Although the relativist is less troubled by the
potential contingency of values than the nonrelativist, even the
staunchest proponent of universal or absolute ethics must
struggle with the identification of proof of values.
Both relativists and nonrelativists therefore rely on the
utility of colloquy in the lengthy process of perfecting ethical
systems. Because our ethical systems have not evolved to a
context out of which they arose," so that "[tjhere are no ethical principles
which hold for everyone universally." Id. This traditional philosophers'
conception of relativism is ultimately untenable, unless we are willing to
consign virtually every activity, including such uncontroversial ones as rape
and murder, to idiosyncratic cultural whim.
Nonetheless, a form of relativism not typically discussed by philosophers
but routinely used by anthropologists is extremely important in the context
of colloquy. The notion of "cultural relativism," suggests that the fair
evaluation of foreign practices requires an adequate understanding of the
cultural context. This variant of relativism does not imply that absolute
judgments can never be made; rather, it warns against premature
judgments grounded in ignorance. Implicit as well is a humbleness that
admits that we are all bound in our epistemology by cultural prejudices, and
that other cultures may be the source of enlightenment that requires
significant immersion, as well as the crossing of difficult boundaries. This
conception of cultural relativism would encourage conversation and colloquy,
in order to improve the quality of understanding through the enlargement
of perspective. Even in a world of absolute right and wrong, the challenges
of knowing right from wrong dictate openness to multicultural conversation,
including efforts to understand the values of another culture within that
culture's own framework. Cultural relativism, as defined in this article, is
not inconsistent with moral absolutism; to the contrary, both are well-served
by resistance against ignorance and receptivity to the ideas of others.
41 Ethical relativism refers to the ostensible "fallacy common to many
writings on human rights, namely the presumption of universality. What
typifies this way of thinking is the belief that human rights exist
independent of culture, ideology, and value systems." ALISON DUNDES
RENTELN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: UNIVERSALISM VERSUS
RELATIVISM 12 (1990).
Renteln suggests that nonrelativist or universalist positions are "a
peculiar form of ethnocentrism insofar as Western ideas are presumed to be
ubiquitous." Id. For a discussion distinguishing this ethical relativist
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state of near perfection, analytical clarity in the discussion of
ethics is more crucial than legal clarity or fixation of ethics,
particularly at the periphery, where discord is most likely to
exist. To encourage such discussion, rational discourse must
be valued over legal clarity. Whereas open discussion among
cultures propels the evolution of ethics, the closure of
discourse through the premature fixation of legal clarity stunts
that evolution.42
More specifically, discourse between initially alien cultures
provides the best example of what have been identified as
"convergence" and "divergence" tendencies in international
settings. Ralston et al. suggest that the meeting of two
cultures results in both convergence, in which "managers in
industrialized nations will embrace the attitudes and
behaviors common to managers in other industrialized nations
despite cultural differences," and divergence, in which
"individuals will retain diverse, culturally based values despite
any economic and social similarities between their nations."
The conflicting tendencies towards convergence and divergence
can be seen as a natural manifestation of both dynamism and
moderation, the receptivity to change tempered by control over
adaptive processes. Convergence represents openness to the
possibility of the existence of better approaches than the
received approach in one's own culture. Divergence reflects a
defensive posture from which hard-earned principles are
endowed with value, so that alteration and change are
permitted only after a process of persuasion."
Achievement of legal clarity through the early imposition
of codes is not only counterproductive to the encouragement of
42 The evolution of common intercultural values, as opposed to the
revolutionary imposition of intercultural values by force of law, creates
breathing room for rational discourse aimed at refining ethical clarity. Such
clarity of analysis and evaluation is the precursor to good codification.
"' David A. Ralston et al., Differences in Managerial Values: A Study of
U.S., Hong Kong and PRC Managers, 24 J. INT'L Bus. STUDIES 249, 251
(1993).
"" When cultures clash, the balancing forces of convergence and
divergence permit the infusion of intelligence and wisdom in the
development of global value systems. In comparison, the expedient, external
imposition of codes, regulations, and laws is potentially inflexible, closed to
the incorporation of new information and perspectives. The intransigence
of promulgated rules can reflect entrenched ethnocentrism, and the
application of power rather than the manifestation of reason.
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analytical clarity through colloquy, it is also highly
impracticable. The legal clarity of codes becomes less feasible
as social, cultural, legal, and linguistic diversity increases.
45
Cohen et al. have identified a number of international and
cultural constraints that may impose pragmatic limitations on
the viability of international ethical codes. 46  They apply
Hofstede's work-related values4 as "moderating constraints"
upon the effectiveness of professional codes of ethics in
directing behaviors in international environments.
4
1
According to the authors, the four moderating constraints-
power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism versus
collectivism, and masculinity versus femininity-result in a
lack of consensus regarding acceptable behavior and the
diversity of interpretation. 9
These four constraints dilute the viability of ethical codes,
especially international codes. Each constraint is a source of
potential derailment. Power distance refers to the "degree of
inequality in power between a more powerful superior and less
powerful subordinate, as perceived by the subordinate."
0
Power distance is a factor relevant to ethical code viability
because differences in power distance are associated with
varying acceptance levels of the authoritarian power that is
inherent in legalistic codes. 1 Uncertainty avoidance is a
measure of rule orientation, employment stability, and stress.
As these three factors vary among cultures, patterns of
obedience to formal codes vary as well. 2 The individualism-
" Most broadly construed, the constraints that bind international ethical
decision-making include public opinion, political systems, individual
managerial decision-making, economic systems, and ethical beliefs, i.e., the
entire panoply of political, economic, and social conditions surrounding and
infusing the process. For explication of a model that incorporates these
intercultural factors, see James Owens, Business Ethics in the College
Classroom, 58 J. Bus. EDUC. 258 (1983).
"' Jeffrey R. Cohen et al., Cultural and Socioeconomic Constraints on
International Codes of Ethics: Lessons from Accounting, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS
687 (1992).
47 GEERT HOFSTEDE, CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES: INTERNATIONAL
DIFFERENCES IN WORK-RELATED VALUES (1980).
4See Cohen et al., supra note 46, at 688.
4' See Cohen et al., supra note 46, at 690-92.
5 See Cohen et al., supra note 46, at 690.
5 See Cohen et al., supra note 46, at 690.
6 See Cohen et al., supra note 46, at 691.
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collectivism dichotomy describes cultural differences with
relative emphasis on self versus community, including
potentially highly conflicting moral evaluations of the good and
evil associated with either orientation." Finally, differences
along the masculine-feminine continuum refer, respectively, to
relative degrees of assertiveness and supportiveness." A
masculine culture may accept as aggressively competitive some
practices that are viewed as unacceptably ruthless in a more
feminine culture.
Cohen et al. suggest that Hofstede's moderating constraints
are substantial sources of culture clash. Magnified across
international boundaries, such constraints subvert even the
best intended codes of ethics by reducing the likelihood that a
code will be consistently interpreted across cultures.55
Moreover, even when consistent interpretation occurs,
acceptance of the code and willingness to abide by it will tend
to be mitigated by a lack of moral consensus derived from the
four sources of disparity."
2.2.2. Codes Without Bite: The Consequences of
Prematurely Choosing Global Over Regional Codification
Because consensus regarding specific behaviors is difficult
to reach under the cross-cultural conditions discussed in the
previous subsection, international codes tend to be so general
as to provide little practical or useful guidance. International
codes often deteriorate into vague statements of
uncontroversial principle, platitudes that are so broad and
generic that it is easy to justify undesirable individual
behaviors within the interstices of interpretation.
For example, the developing United Nations Code of
Conduct on Transnational Corporations requires transnational
corporations ("TNCs," the U.N. nomenclature equivalent to
MNCs) to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms,
contribute to the promotion of exports, help to train citizens in
the host country, and act to protect the environment.5 7 The
5 See Cohen et al., supra note 46, at 691.
"See Cohen et al., supra note 46, at 691.
sSee Cohen et al., supra note 46, at 692.
56 See Cohen et al., supra note 46, at 691.
5 G.R. Bassiry, Business Ethics and the United Nations: A Code of
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Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises are likewise
vague,58 stating for example that Enterprises should "favor
close co-operation with the local community and business
interests," and "allow their component entities freedom to
develop their activities and to exploit their competitive
advantage in domestic and foreign markets, consistent with
the need for specialisation and sound commercial practice.""9
These codes exemplify the low level of specificity contained
in many international codes. The mandate to respect human
rights, for example, does not suggest what those rights are.
Moreover, U.S. constitutional controversy in areas such as race
relations and women's rights indicates that consensus at the
margins is difficult to reach domestically, let alone
internationally.6 0 Once cultural differences in the conception
of human rights are interposed in the interpretation of this
edict, the principle of respect for human rights is so broad as
to approach meaninglessness when applied by different
decisionmakers. 61
These observations suggest the existence of a point along
a slippery slope at which there is intercultural value consensus
adequate to sustain international codes that are explicit
enough to be useful and practicable by virtue of a legitimacy
Conduct, SAM ADVANCED MGMT. J., Autumn 1990, at 38, 39.
" The OECD Guidelines do have a few specific provisions that render
some clear guidance, such as an edict against the payment of bribes, and the
prohibition of the tendering of illegal political contributions. OECD
Guidelines, supra note 30, at 93. Of course, the value of a prohibition of
activities that are already illegal by definition is negligible.
s OECD Guidelines, supra note 30, at 93.
60 Policies for the achievement of equal opportunity are controversial in
general public discourse and in constitutional analysis. Issues like
affirmative action, race and gender quotas, and small business set-asides
have been subject to debate among both lawyers and laypersons in the
1990s.
61 There is a legitimate reason that the terms of international codes tend
to be general, vague, and of little help in rendering actual guidance for
particularized decisionmaking. Without minimally well-developed
community consensus, only codifications with a high degree of conceptual
breadth and abstraction can receive enough support to be enacted. At the
present juncture the world lacks adequate community to create meaningful
global codes of ethics. It is likely that the pursuit of early codification will
result in the creation of meaningless provisions, the only provisions for
which there exists adequate support.
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achieved by broad-based support. Presently, the global
community has evolved to a point at which there are cross-
cultural value clusters but relatively little worldwide
consensus. 2 Truly international codes of ethics may be
premature in the 1990s because the global community has not
yet evolved beyond the intermediate stage of micro-geographic
cluster communities. If regional clusters characterize the
present growth stage of international community, then
regional rather than global codification is probably the only
form of compulsion that can presently be supported by social
consensus and perceived legitimacy. Furthermore, once the
evolutionary process has advanced sufficiently, such regional
cluster codes can logically facilitate the eventual globalization
of community values. The next step will be intercultural
assimilation and accommodation between regional clusters
that are presently only in the process of developing provisional
community identities.6 "
62 Wines and Napier's model of cross-cultural ethics recognizes these
micro-clusters in the form of "value strings" that link related but separate
cultures through the sharing of moral values. See William A. Wines &
Nancy K. Napier, Toward an Understanding of Cross-Cultural Ethics: A
Tentative Model, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 831, 835-37 (1992). The authors note,
for example, that 'there may be some moral values common to North
American or European cultures and others more prevalent in East Asian
cultures." Id. at 836.
63 The viability of mandatory international codes is also likely to conflict
with national rights of self-determination in a world still officially
characterized by sovereignty. For a discussion of the right of self-
determination, see JOHN RAwLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 378 (1971). For a
brief discussion of the related issues of national autonomy, see BOUNDARIES:
NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND ITS LIMITS 79-100 (Peter G. Brown & Henry Shue
eds., 1981). The United Nations has recognized an international right to
self-determination, including a peoples' right to "freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development." International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, art. 1, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 5. Taken seriously, the right
to self-determination limits the utility of mandatory international codes by
restricting application to those forums that voluntarily adopt the code.
Furthermore, once a collection of sovereign states agrees to be bound by
adopting a code, one critical logistical challenge is likely to remain: the
translation of international morality into international law which depends
upon viable centralized institutions of enforcement. For a discussion of the
feasibility of maintaining international legal and moral order without such
centralized institutions, see TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY AND THE
RELATIONS OF STATES 115-148 (1983). Self-determination is a principle
that recognizes the inherent difficulties associated with the attempted
universalization of norms without prior persuasion. Even when the
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2.2.3. The Absence of Cultural Cohesion
The feasibility of an international code is limited by the
tension inherent in the modern concept of a global community.
Beyond a relatively small number of ethical positions that are
universally adopted and considered incontrovertibly valid, the
norms of ethical behavior are dictated largely by community
standards." Potentially universal edicts will be akin to those
identified by Donaldson as protecting "fundamental
international rights"5 such as laws or codes that prohibit
torture.
Most daily ethical challenges faced by business and the
professions are not so easily resolved. With regard to rules of
behavior established around custom or a social cost-benefit
analysis which do not arise from any clearly defined, universal
principle, the development of effective, justifiable ethics
depends upon processes that are sensitive to social and
cultural differences. In such instances, the means must
balance the needs and values of corporate, domestic, and
relevant world cultures."6 An example of the kind of ethical
issue that cannot be resolved effectively by resort to universal
principles is that of lawyer billing practices. 7 The American
persuader is judged by the persuaded as ultimately having been correct,
acknowledgement of autonomous rule requires that subjection to mandatory
standards be imposed from within.
" Thus, while one commentator accurately has acknowledged the
"internationalization of human rights," the sphere of human rights that
effectively can be universalized to override traditional theories of national
and cultural sovereignty is small. Jorge Carpizo, The Current Tendencies
of Human Rights, 23 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 373, 374-75 (1992).
er See THOMAS DONALDSON, THE ETHIcs OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 76
(1989).
" In this regard, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the
American Management Association has aptly warned: "In the global
economy, if we are going to write rules of behavior, those rules must be
framed in the context of world citizenry so that employees have the ability
to adapt to local customs yet comply with the values that define the
corporate character." David Fagiano, Ethics in a Shrinking World, MGMT.
REV., Mar. 1993, at 2.
7 Professional billing is only one of many examples of ethical questions
that may reflect a degree of policy adoption, and is not entirely referable to
easily universalized principles. This example was chosen because it has not
received substantial attention in the academic literature. Other examples
such as the payment of bribes, are also relevant and important, but have
been covered in such detail by so many scholars that another examination
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Bar Association (ABA) has recently issued a formal opinion
regarding a practice known as "double billing," or the charging
of more than one client for the same work or overlapping
work."8 The ABA opinion forbids double billing without client
approval. The ABA approach is appealing because it preserves
contractual freedom and simultaneously protects consumers by
requiring both voluntary and informed consent. Nonetheless,
the double billing dilemma provides an interesting example of
the indeterminacy of ethical issues at the "ethical periphery"
(i.e., the realm of ethics beyond basic, fundamental rights).""
At the periphery, ethical questions may be resolved more
effectively by reference to established community norms and
public policy than by reference to ostensibly fundamental or
universal principles. In the case of lawyer billing, reasonable
arguments can be made against and in favor of double billing,
even in the limited institutional and cultural context of U.S.
business and professional practices. In condemnation of the
practice, double billing can be challenged as unfair because it
provides multiple total compensation for a single unit of work.
Thus the lawyer who triple bills for four hours of actual work,
originally done for Client 1, receives compensation for twelve
hours of work. The purported unfairness of this billing
practice can also be viewed from the perspectives of Clients 2
and 3, each of whom paid for four hours of incremental work,
when the actual output of labor was just the time necessary to
convert the fruits of the first effort to suit the needs of each of
the latter two clients.
In support of this practice, double billing can be seen as
eminently fair because each client is purchasing a four-hour
product that took four hours to create. Moreover, an edict
is unlikely to add new insight. For a review and bibliography of some of the
vast literature on the ethics of bribery, see John Tsalikis & Osita
Nwachukwu, A Comparison of Nigerian to American Views of Bribery and
Extortion in International Commerce, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 85, 85-86 (1991).
;8 Amy Stevens, ABA Tackles Firms' Tendencies for Creative Clockwork
in Billing, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 1993, at B10.
"The realm of reasonably controvertible ethical positions is referred to
as the "ethical periphery," or the "periphery" for short. At the periphery,
both ethics and legal codes develop interactively: emergent community
norms can become informal standards and formal, authoritarian codes
infuse community expectations. Likewise, the formalization of codes
legitimizes and reinforces the community values that provide the foundation
of the law.
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against double billing is fraught with logistical difficulties. If
Client 1 pays for the four hours of initial labor, and Client 2
can be charged only for actual incremental labor required for
conversion of use from Client 1 to Client 2, for example, one-
half hour, then Client 1 has inadvertently subsidized the
product of Client 2. This inequity can be resolved by any of a
number of policies, such as simply permitting the attorney to
charge each client four hours for a four-hour product, or by
creating detailed rules for the latter client's contribution to the
expenses originally incurred by the initial client. 0
Even within the confines of the United States, the rules of
fair billing in the legal profession are unlikely to be resolved
by reference to deontological principles." Policy questions
are resolved by a debate which centers around a negotiated
understanding and from which a set of community
expectations are generated. Because specific issues associated
with lawyer billing are not subject to incontrovertible
principles or universal rules, the eventual choice of community
expectations will be somewhat arbitrary. These expectations
nonetheless will be compelling because they reflect the
contractually derived rules that have been determined by
consensus to define the realm of fair play. Once such rules are
established and accepted, they develop their own moral
authority as representatives of community expectations. In
other words, while the policy chosen may not be inherently
superior to the rejected alternatives, relations will adjust
themselves around the received policy, thus infusing it with
70 These two examples are based on differing judgments regarding
ownership of the product. The first approach implies that the lawyer owns
a matrix that can be sold to any buyer at full cost. The latter approach
implies that Client 1 purchased and owns a custom-designed product and
should therefore have the right to royalties upon the resale of that product.
71 One possible deontological principle that reasonably can support a
number of policy alternatives is the broad principle of honesty, refined in
business and professional practice in the form of disclosure requirements.
In other words, any approach regarding the ultimate ownership of lawyers'
work product can be justified as reasonable, provided that the parties know
the rules of the game. This suggests that the ABA policy appears more
capable of being universalized than a more random policy that is not
supported by an ostensibly absolute deontological duty. Relativists may
suggest, however, that the value of honesty is either not fundamentally
capable of being universalized, or that a culture may embrace other
preeminent values that supersede honesty in ways that are inaccessible
under essentially Western conceptions of ethics.
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legitimacy and meaning.72
If, for example, the U.S. legal and business communities
accepted the edict against double billing, parties would
incorporate this norm into their transactions for legal services.
Client 1 may be willing to pay x under a system that
prescribes double billing, x-y under a system that allows the
lawyer to bill subsequent clients for the work, and x+z in a
system that allows double billing but requires partial
reimbursement of royalties to the client who originally
commissioned the work. While arguments exist for and
against each policy option, and while one is arguably more
economically sound than another, acceptance of any clearly
stated policy that is approved by the community allows a free
market economy to adjust to the system through the pricing
mechanism as demonstrated in this hypothetical.
Because policy questions frequently are not resolved by
resort to universal principles, they lack inherent value, and
should be most effective when infused with the artificial value
derived from widespread community consensus. The case of
double billing reveals that the creation of policy from norms of
international communities produces special challenges. On the
domestic front, the discourse from which community consensus
develops can be begun with a relative degree of mutual
foundational understanding. Within the United States there
exists a relatively common understanding regarding the role
of lawyers, the nature of the relationship between lawyer and
client, and the commonly accepted procedures for the billing of
services. In contrast, a fundamental understanding about
72 The implication is that by defining policy questions as those that do
not address issues that can be resolved by reference to universal principles
concerning fundamental rights, the process by which the policies are
developed becomes more important than the policies that are ultimately
chosen. When the questions at issue require a workable solution, there are
either a number of equally useful solutions, or a number of solutions that
vary in terms of net utility, any of which are at least satisfactory. In other
words, policy that does not regard fundamental rights can be answered by
any of several viable approaches. As the particular selection among these
approaches becomes less compelling by virtue of their fungibility, the
processes by which the selection occurs gains in relative stature. While the
ultimate choice is unimportant, the community participation in the
selection, and the degree to which the selection approaches universal
approval, are crucial to both the ultimate degree of compliance and the level
of satisfaction among the community regarding the legitimacy of the legal
process.
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these variables may not exist in regard to lawyer billing issues
in international transactions. In other countries, lawyers may
not work by the hour or they may be expected to provide
services for standard fees, as a doctor in the United States will
charge a certain fee for an appendectomy, or a dentist will
charge a fixed amount for a porcelain crown. These two
protocols logically imply divergent substantive
conceptualizations of a lawyer's product. Billing by the hour
suggests that a client agrees to pay only for the attorney's
actual expenditure of time. Under this protocol, double billing
is likely to be deceptive and unethical. Billing for the product
suggests that the client agrees in advance that the end result
is worth a certain price. The implication is that the profit of
the lawyer is only the lawyer's concern: if the lawyer is highly
inefficient, then the lawyer may actually suffer an economic
loss. Conversely, any efficiencies that the lawyer realizes are
the source of profit. Under this protocol, the lawyer's product
is much like a consumer product. The buyer only knows that
the product is worth $n to him or her. Fluctuations in profit
to the seller based on economies of scale or scope are viewed
as purely the seller's business. Since the two protocols, billing
by the hour and billing for the end product, reflect these
significantly divergent foundational philosophies, the utility of
either is likely to depend most crucially on the degree of
community consensus surrounding the policy chosen.
The divergence of philosophies, traditions, and practices
between the United States and other nations serves to
complicate issues such as ethical billing in international
contexts. As business markets become increasingly global, the
markets for legal services to support international business
also are likely to globalize. ABA billing standards may not
answer the kinds of complex challenges that are likely to arise
in these international transactions for legal services.
When a community embraces broadly condoned value
systems, codification of the periphery7" is most viable because
"' The periphery refers to the area denoted by Donaldson and Dunfee as
"moral free space," in which the application of fundamental rights or
universal principles of ethics is insufficient to resolve conflict. See Thomas
Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Integratiue Social Contracts Theory: A
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formal laws in well-established communities are supported by
belief patterns that more closely approach ubiquity.
Conversely, when communities are relatively undeveloped,
formal codes are vulnerable at both the theoretical and the
pragmatic levels. At the theoretical level, dissident members
of a loosely-configured community can challenge the legitimacy
of its code because peripheral principles are not self-evident.
Thus, broad community consensus is required if a code is to be
justifiably binding. At the pragmatic level, dissidents will be
more likely to disobey7' or revolt against7 codification at
the periphery because they disagree with its underlying values
and because the numbers of potential dissidents in such
loosely-held communities will confer the power to disagree.'
The question of compliance is difficult because two possible
sources of ethical error exist. First, in cases in which the
"" Charles H. Taquey, Free Trade: The Ethics of Nations, 141 DIOGENES
112, 116 (1988) (recognizing the irrelevance of "[]egalized morality" in the
face of the "will to ignore it").
" Development of the United Nations Code of Conduct on Transnational
Corporations has been frustrated by geopolitical dissent that reflects the
practical difficulties in the achievement of codification without a sufficiently
unified community foundation. See THE NEW CODE ENVIRONMENT, UNITED
NATIONS CENTRE ON TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS CURRENT STUDIES at
17, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/SER.A/16, U.N. Sales No. E.90.II.A.7 (1990)
(discussing the "political impasse" experienced in development of the United
Nations Code).
"6 Even in cohesive and well-developed communities, ethics will shift in
response to two kinds of change: internal change within an industry or
profession, and social change in the broader community environment in
which the industry or profession operates. These changes of ethical norms
will cause changes to occur in codes as well. Jeanne F. Backof & Charles L.
Martin, Jr., Historical Perspectives: Development of the Codes of Ethics in
the Legal, Medical and Accounting Professions, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 99, 108
(1991). Because the norms and the codes that reflect them are always in
some state of flux, consensus can never be complete. Nonetheless, there is
a difference between developmental discord associated with the process of
ethical evolution within well-established communities, andthe fundamental
discord that exists when there is no established community or when codes
of ethics are imposed upon divergent communities. In the former instance,
the foundation of established values and behavioral patterns, while ever-
changing, provides the foundation for acceptance of codification in the
abstract. Changes in the code simply enhance its legitimacy. Conversely,
in the latter instance, there is no foundation from which acceptance of the
concept of a code in the abstract can be derived. Change in these instances
does not comprise the creative process of evolution and perfection of a
dynamic ideal, but rather comprises the destructive process of subversion
of an illegitimate source of authority.
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encoded virtues are desirable virtues (i.e., qualities that would
survive over time as community values become increasingly
congealed under rigorous debate and scrutiny)"' a code may
nonetheless become the focal point of protest or rebellion based
on the perceived lack of democratic legitimacy, rather than on
the substantive precepts themselves. Second, when the
encoded virtues are not desirable virtues,7 s and they contain
flaws that would be revealed during a process of discussion
and scrutiny over a reasonable span of time,"" such codes
may be subject to mindless conformity on the part of those
most temperamentally obedient to the force of law." In these
instances, individual analysis without the influence of
codification may have yielded behavior superior to that
" The idea of virtues being desirable in regard to peripheral questions
is culturally constrained. Because this author argues that at the periphery
choice is affected more by process than by substance, what is viewed as
desirable is contingent upon its fit with the community as it eventually
unfolds.
"8 Codification can consist of "bad" legislation. Max Weber has labelled
this type of lawmaking "formally" or "substantively irrational." Max Weber,
Types of Lawmaking and Lawfinding, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 368, 369
(William M. Evan ed., 1980) ("Both lawmaking and lawfinding may be either
rational or irrational. They are 'formally irrational' when one applies in
lawmaking or lawfinding means which cannot be controlled by the intellect,
for instance when recourse is had to oracles or substitutes therefor.
Lawmaking and lawfinding are 'substantively irrational' on the other hand
to the extent that decision is influenced by concrete factors of the particular
case as evaluated upon an ethical, emotional, or political basis rather than
by general norms.").
While one may justifiably contest Weber's definition of irrational
lawmaking, his emphasis on the intellect rather than such talismans as
oracle correctly suggests that good law is a function of intelligent discourse
and analysis rather than superstition or blind obedience to tradition. Any
tendency to derive codes from facile consultation of the latter may
potentially yield what I am labelling "Type Two" error.
" The two types of codification risks are built on admittedly contrary
tendencies. The former risk is predicated on a tendency to disobey laws that
are perceived to lack legitimacy. The latter risk presupposes a tendency to
obey codes blindly, without regard to their perceived usefulness. The fact
that the risks are premised upon contrary tendencies does not render them
inconsistent. Rather, it suggests that each risk is fed by the predicted
behaviors of different groups of people or actuated by diametric
temperamental orientations or inconsistent behavior by individuals.
so Professionals are unlikely to violate professional codes, even when
there is a conflict between personal and official precepts. See Robert
Hauptman & Fred Hill, Deride, Abide or Dissent: On the Ethics of
Professional Conduct, 10 J. BUS. ETHICS 37, 42 (1991).
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encouraged by the inadequately scrutinized code."1 Because
codification precludes certain instances of superior individual
analysis, the net quality of behavior can be expected to
decline. 2
Premature codification is also risky at another level. It
increases the likelihood that self-serving rules and standards
will be adopted in the guise of public protection." Codes or
standards purporting to further the public interest through
increased "professionalization" may in fact have self-serving
subtexts, masking opportunism and insulating corporations or
firms from accountability or social responsibility.'" One
study suggests that at the corporate level, the dominant
function of codes is protection of the firm. 5 The ability of
authoritarian sources to adopt codes of veiled opportunism is
magnified in international situations, where an incremental
layer of complexity derived from cultural variation acts as a
potential smoke screen. Unsophisticated critics who lack a
finely tuned understanding of the cross-cultural questions at
stake may be unable to discern the true motives and effects of
the code." These observations suggest that codification of
"1 Brief et al. have demonstrated that there is a tendency to discard
personal values when decisionmakers are held accountable to an external
standard regarding which they possess explicit knowledge. See Arthur P.
Brief et al., Resolving Ethical Dilemmas in Management: Experimental
Investigations of Values, Accountability, and Choice, 21 J. APPLIED SOC.
PSYCHOL. 380, 392-93 (1991). This finding suggests that the risk of
mindless conformity to authoritarian codes of ethics is significant.
s2 Of course, one can argue that such an error may be balanced by a
countervailing preclusion of independent behaviors that are inferior to
behaviors that conform to premature codification. This argument assumes
a randomness that will be undermined by the tendency of rationality to
favor superior independent judgments over inferior independent judgments,
if good faith is held constant.
83 The potential for the adoption of self-serving rules and regulations is
great, given that neither corporate management nor shareholders are
disinterested agents. For a discussion of the pressures that may cause these
important stakeholders to adopt self-serving policies in the guise of ethics,
see Dobson, Ethics, supra note 9, at 25-26.
84 BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1976); Lisa
H. Newton, Lawgiving for Professional Life: Reflections on the Place of the
Professional Code, Bus. & PROF. ETHICS J., Fall 1991, at 41, 45-51.
s' Maurica Lefebvre & Jang B. Singh, The Content and Focus of
Canadian Corporate Codes of Ethics, 11 J. Bus. ETHICS 799, 808 (1992).
" When codes artificially attempt to invent and impose transnational
norms without the benefit of a well-developed underlying consensus of a
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values has greater potential within highly cohesive, well-
developed communities"7 than within culturally fragmented,
developing communities."8  Codification prior to the
development of a traditional community structure becomes
totalitarianism at the extremes because moral judgments are
imposed absolutely without a source of democratic support.89
Popular patronage requires a sufficiently developed
community. While the exponential growth of technology has
forced the world into the status of a single community, efforts
to govern that community must account for its embryonic
nature. The global community has been forced into premature
proximity. As the Twentieth Century draws to a close, nations
must coexist before mutual cultural assimilation can occur. It
is likely that efforts to force assimilation by prematurely
codifying ethical codes would be ineffective and dangerous.
Laws without underlying values are meaningless to those who
do not understand them, because their foundations are alien.
Further, the application of laws without an understanding of
true community, they are more susceptible to industrial or professional
subversion. This is because the alien quality of extra-cultural values is
poorly understood by those to whom it is applied, and this relatively low
comprehension and perceived complexity will tend to encourage acceptance
on faith. In the absence of clear, open, and rigorous colloquy, ulterior
motives and effects pass more easily without notice.
87 The emphasis on well-developed community as a requisite of
compulsory ethical strictures incorporates a "social relatedness" model of
business ethics, which emphasizes the inevitably organic relationship
between ethical decisions and social structure. For a discussion of this
model, see John H. Barnett, The American Executive and Colombian
Violence: Social Relatedness and Business Ethics, 10 J. Bus. ETHIcS 853,
858-59 (1991). An emphasis on such relations suggests that the legitimacy
of the derivation of the rules may prove more important than the technical
enforceability of rules.
"" The history of British common law and its derivatives serves as a
model of codification and stages of community development. Early law was
exclusively common law, reflecting the need for emerging community
standards to drive the gradual process of developing community consensus.
Statutory laws have become increasingly prevalent as common law nations
develop a more refined foundation of community standards upon which they
can reasonably build.
"' The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a nexus between imposed ethics
and the development of an ethical community. The Court discusses rights,
for example, as reflecting "the basic values that underlie our society," and
being "rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people." Daniel J.
Morrissey, Moral Truth and the Law: A New Look at an Old Link, 47 SMU
L. REV. 61, 65 (1993) (citations omitted).
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their purpose is a potential source of international and
intercultural resentment and hostility.9 0
Taken in toto, the observations in this section suggest that
the world may be forced to accede to ethical ambiguity and
conflict for the foreseeable future. These observations reflect
a belief that this turmoil is unavoidable and that it is
preferable to ethical coercion among nations and within
emerging cultures. Ethical standards exist without
authoritarian codes. The logistical problems associated with
formulating and implementing international ethical codes
direct us in either of two divergent policy directions. The
sanctity of a code's ideals can be preserved and its proponents
can seek means of reducing or eliminating its moderating
constraints. Conversely, the moderating constraints, in
tandem with other shortcomings of ethical codes in
international contexts, support the conclusion that such codes
are not presently the most appropriate or useful means of
encouraging ethical behavior.
3. RECONCILING THE INTERESTS OF COMMUNITY AND
EXPEDIENCY: THE PARADOX OF THE "VOLUNTARY CODE"
In the previous Section, the adoption of quick, mandatory
solutions to ethical challenges prior to the development of
community values was criticized based on the observation that
the foundation of community serves two vital functions in the
evolution of an ethical system: (1) the rigorous testing of
values, and (2) the establishment of a support base upon which
compliance with the values can be implemented effectively.
Implicitly, the codification of some controversial ethical issues
* William C. Frederick suggests that the existence ofinternational codes
of ethics may be evidence of developing global community standards.
William C. Frederick, The Moral Authority of Transnational Corporate
Codes, 10 J. Bus. ETHIcs 165 (1991). Frederick argues that the normative
prescriptions and proscriptions contained in these codes embody "a moral
authority that transcends national boundaries and societal differences,
thereby invoking or manifesting a universal or transcultural standard of
corporate ethical behavior." Ide. at 165. While this assertion may be true,
it may also be false, embodying a potential tautology. The existence of codes
does not prove the existence of underlying community values. Because
codes are authoritarian and coercive in nature, they can and do exist
without underlying constituency support, provided that the authority
imposing the code has the power to do so. While a code may be evidence of
consensus, it may also be a mere manifestation of the force of rule.
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at the corporate, professional, national, and international
levels presently is neither legitimate nor viable.
These dangers can be averted by delaying the mandatory
enactment of controversial value systems while emphasizing
the colloquial development of a foundational community
consensus. The emphasis on colloquy suggests that the
interests of speed and certainty, which are furthered by
premature codification, will be outweighed by the interests of
open discussion and persuasion during early stages of
community development.
Of course, the stage of consensus sufficient to support the
codification of values exists at some indeterminate location on
a slippery slope. 1 The cultivation of community includes a
phase of ambiguous consensus regarding many ethical
issues. 2  At this stage, consensus grows such that
codification gradually contains fewer problems of legitimacy
and viability. There is no precise point at which enough
community consensus exists to justify codification of values.
Because the ambiguous stage provides no clear transition point
for the change from idiosyncracy to codification,93 the vehicle
of the voluntary code is a valuable hybrid that can be used to
translate community development into sustainable law.
Pratt has identified the voluntary code as a mechanism for
91 This author does not suggest that broadly supported community
standards are feasible with regard to all ethical questions. Rather, the
author posits that codification of ethics is untenably coercive unless broad-
based community support can be garnered, and that codification should be
delayed until such support exists.
2 At this point, acceptance of norms may not be as broad as it will
eventually become through the process of evolution of values. Values at this
stage are likely to be unclear, indistinct, or blurred. In other words, both
the degree and the focus of consensus are not fully realized.
"8 A distinct point of ideal codification is difficult to locate because the
process of developing a community (i.e., shifting from highly idiosyncratic,
divergent value systems to cohesive, potentially codifiable value systems)
includes the intermediate steps of colloquy and convergence. The entire
chain, then, goes from idiosyncracy to colloquy to convergence to
codification. The insular nature of belief outside the realm of community
begins to erode from the insights generated in the colloquial process, which
entails the refinement of ideas and some individual concessions via
persuasion. These concessions, when accumulated, drive the gradual
convergence of previously separate ideologies. The greater the convergence,
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facilitating "mutual adjustment"94 when cultural differences
impede the development of policy in areas such as
environmental protection. 5 He suggests that a voluntary
code of conduct may be crucial in averting conflicts between
MNCs and host countries.9 6 Pratt does not examine the
nature and prescribed utility of voluntary codes in any detail,
but he suggests that such codes will serve a crucial function in
transnational settings such as the facilitation of an "active
diologic communication."" This relationship between the
voluntary code and the enhancement of dialogue suggests that
we further explore the potential of such codes to bridge the
ambiguous area between idiosyncracy and consensus.
Voluntary codes are not mere theoretical constructs. A
United Nations Report defines a code of conduct in a manner
evocative of the qualities of a voluntary code, as "a consistent
set of recommendations which are gradually evolved and which
may be revised as experience or circumstances require." 8
The Report notes that while such codes are "not compulsory in
character, they act as an instrument of moral persuasion,
strengthened by the authority of international organizations
and the support of public opinion.""
Perez-Lopez has catalogued and analyzed numerous
existing and historical voluntary codes"° concerning rights
of employees which serve as exemplars of the concept: the
Sullivan Principles,' 0 ' the MacBride Principles, 02  the
94 John Paluszek, Public Relations in The Coming Global Economy, in
VITAL SPEECHES OF THE DAY, October 15, 1989, at 23.
"s Cornelius B. Pratt, Multinational Corporate Social Policy Process for
EthicalResponsibility in Sub-SaharanAfrica, 10 J. Bus. ETHICS 527, 530-31
(1991).
O6 Id. at 530.
7 Id.
98 U.N. DEP'T OF ECONOMICS AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS, THE IMPACT OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS ON DEVELOPMENT AND ON INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, at 55, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/6, U.N. Sales No. E.74.II.A.5 (1974).
9 Id.
100 Jorge F. Perez-Lopez, Promoting International Respect For Worker
Rights Through Business Codes of Conduct, 17 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1 (1993).
101 The Sullivan Principles, created as a means for achieving racial
equality in South Africa, were developed and revised during the 1980s. For
a discussion of the Sullivan Principles, see Leon H. Sullivan, The Sullivan
Principles and Change in South Africa, in BUSINESS IN THE CONTEMPORARY
WORLD 175 (Herbert L. Sawyer ed., 1988).
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Slepak Principles,"'3 the Miller Principles,'"°  and the
Maquiladora Standards of Conduct."°5  While these
voluntary codes have created principled standards for
unilateral choice rather than mandatory standards enforced by
compulsion of law,' they have resulted in social change and
fostered an international dialogue that has yielded reforms in
the United States and beyond.
1 0 7
Paradoxically, because compliance with voluntary codes is
optional, voluntary codes are potentially more powerful than
true codes. The ultimate power of voluntary codes is a result
of their encouragement of rigorous debate which ultimately
improves the quality of the code. Debate of mandatory law can
be chilled by the perception that the process is inefficient.
Because immediate compliance is not a strategic variable for
any institution, time allocated to discourse can be justified
only if the probability of legislative reform is feasible and cost
effective.' This means that a greater number of potential
10 The MacBride Principles are intended to address the problem of anti-
Catholic discrimination by U.S. companies doing business in Northern
Ireland. See Lisette M. Currier, Religion and Employment in Northern
Ireland: U.S. Influence on Anti-Discrimination Legislation, 12 COMP. LAB.
L.J. 73 app. B. at 103-04 (1990).
"' The Slepak Principles address human rights issues associated with
activity in the former Soviet Union. For a discussion of the Slepak
Principles, see Perez-Lopez, supra note 100, at 12-16.
104 The Miller Principles, which address human rights in the People's
Republic of China and Tibet, were originally contained in a bill presented
to Congress. H.R. 1571, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
105 The Maquiladora Standards of Conduct were created by the Coalition
for Justice in the Maquiladoras. The Standards address health, safety,
employment, and environmental issues associated with U.S.-Mexican border
manufacturing facilities. For a discussion of the Maquiladora Standards,
see Perez-Lopez, supra note 100, at 19-23.
10" Only one of these voluntary codes, the Sullivan Principles, eventually
became mandatory. See Perez-Lopez, supra note 100, at 26-27. For
codification related to the original Sullivan Principles, see Comprehensive
Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, 100 Stat. 1087 (1986)
(codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 5001-5116 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (Sections 5051-
73 were subsequently omitted from the original Act by Executive Order No.
12,769, 56 Fed. Reg. 31,855 (1991), as authorized by Section 5061(a) of that
Title.); Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving South
Africa, Exec. Order No. 12,532, 3 C.F.R. 387 (1986), reprinted in 50 U.S.C.
§ 1701 (1988).
10" Perez-Lopez, supra note 100, at 43-44.
108 The term "strategic variable" refers to a factor that confers upon the
decision-maker a meaningful choice, i.e., one that can have a material effect.
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change agents will be attracted to the debate of precatory
norms than of mandatory norms, simply because the hurdle for
achieving some return on the investment in the process is
lower. Accordingly, more vigorous discussion will ensue.
Debate of voluntary codes is beneficial because compliance
options exist. A discussion of voluntary codes has two
potentially positive social effects. First, colloquy improves the
likelihood that compliance will be undergirded by changes in
social values, so that decisionmakers develop bona fide
personal ownership of those values. This internalization will
increase the likelihood that decisionmakers will abide by the
spirit of the code, even when loopholes provide an escape from
the letter of the code. Second, colloquy acts as a marketing
tool, augmenting the constellation to which transactions of the
terms of the voluntary code are applied.' Discussion thus
translates into exposure, which may lead to the types of
fanning effects observed by Perez-Lopez, as when Sullivan-like
principles were adopted worldwide."0
Kline has identified a pragmatic advantage of the
voluntary code-the "element of voluntary adherence" may be
necessary to recruit initial support from otherwise skeptical
stakeholders." According to Kline, "[aicceptance of the
voluntary mode has been essential to secure participation in
The suggested principles of a voluntary code concern a strategic variable-
they grant the decision-maker the latitude to choose among alternatives, so
that debate has an immediate benefit in terms of the quality of instant
decisions. Conversely, true codes do not create a strategic variable for law-
abiding decision-makers. Because they are compelled by force to adhere to
the terms of the code, expenditure of time analyzing the quality of those
terms yields no immediate return. Moreover, such expenditure yields no
long-term return unless the decision-maker believes that code reform is a
viable possibility.
101 These transactions may or may not result in the sale of a voluntary
code, i.e., in the internalization of its norms through individual purchase
and ownership of its belief system. This is a benefit of using voluntary
codes in developing communities. Personal investments in the marketed
terms of such codes will be made individually, based on the perceived value
of those terms. The terms will or will not germinate in the normative
system of the emerging community, depending on the degree of aggregate
individual adoption.
See JOHN M. KLINE, INTERNATIONAL CODES AND MULTINATIONAL
BUSINESS: SETTING GUIDELINES FOR INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS OPERATIONS
89-110 (1985).
.. Id. at 46.
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the [United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Code on Restrictive Business Practices] by most Western
governments as well as the acquiescence of many
corporations."" The transitional function of the voluntary
code is valuable. It complements a healthy reluctance of
stakeholders to adopt mandatory policies that have neither
been fully discussed nor provisionally tested.
Raiborn and Payne's definition of a code of ethics requires
the qualities of "clarity, comprehensiveness, and
enforceability."" Based on that definition, the idea of a
voluntary code is an oxymoron because a set of principles must
be mandatory to be enforceable under Raiborn and Payne's
definition. Thus, the discussion of voluntary codes must define
such codes and explain how the hybridization of two
inconsistent concepts, voluntariness and enforceability, can be
reconciled. If a voluntary code of ethics is defined as a
provisional set of precepts or principles which are not officially
binding and which attempt to capture the developing cross-
cultural confluence of norms and values in emerging
communities, the ideas of voluntariness and enforceability are
harmonized, thus creating a crossbreed mechanism for the
development of consensus out of idiosyncracy and controversy.
Under the preceding definition, the principles and precepts
of a voluntary code are neither technically nor legally binding,
and alteration and change are permitted, encouraged, and
expected. Ultimately, compliance with a voluntary code occurs
by election, not compulsion. A voluntary code is more
suggestive and less coercive, more tentative and less certain
than a true code. While both varieties of codes remain subject
to amendment, change is more natural and acceptable in the
case of the provisional than in the case of the established and
determined.
This analysis does not suggest that U.S. law is entirely
unadaptable or immalleable. In fact, law in the United States
is remarkably fluid." Instead, the analysis indicates the
112 I&
1 ' See Cecily A. Raiborn & Dinah Payne, Corporate Codes of Conduct:
A Collective Conscience and Continuum, 9 J. Bus. ETHICS 879, 883 (1990).
114 Legislative change occurs frequently, often accompanying shifts in
political incumbency. Similarly, common law as bound by stare decisis is
increasingly viewed by the courts as flexible, and subject to shifting
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relative likelihood and ease of cultural norm shifts under
voluntary versus mandatory codification. Both citizens and
politicians tend to view the enactment of true codes as a finite
process. The stages of that process in a republican democracy
are roughly the stages of rational decisionmaking: defining
the problem, identifying criteria for solving the problem,
attributing weights to the criteria, generating alternatives,
rating the alternatives based on the weighted criteria, and
selecting the optimal solution." The process has a
beginning and an end. This finite quality implies that
selection of a decision alternative is followed by a shift to new
problems, so that we view the successful codification of ethical
and other dilemmas as a termination. Although the decisions
adopted in a true code are subject to modification, change is
bounded by the force of inertia generated by the sense of
completion that accrues at the end of a finite process. Once
adopted, a true code can be seen as static unless levels of
dissatisfaction reach a high threshold, thus driving legislative
decisionmakers to adopt modification. The closure generated
by successful codification thus creates a baseline of stasis. The
substantive issues resolved in the process of codification are
unlikely to be reexamined without a critical event capable of
shifting social and political perception of the issue from the
realm of the closed to the realm of the open."'
Contrast a true code with a voluntary code. While not
legally binding, a voluntary code is evocative of the state of the
art. As defined herein, a voluntary code is a provisional
statement of the present status of the moral conversation.
Whereas a true code is a snapshot of ostensibly fixed and
determined moral reality, a voluntary code is a frame from a
community standards. See, e.g., Edwards v. Clinton Valley Center, 360
N.W. 2d 606 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984).
", For greater explication of this rational decision process, see generally
MAX H. BAZERMAN, JUDGMENT IN MANAGERIAL DECISION MAKING at 3-4 (2d
ed. 1990).
"' True codification cannot avoid this all-or-nothing dualism.
Codification is implicitly a statement that we have found a workable
solution, and efforts at recodification will not be triggered unless lawmakers
believe that the code is seriously flawed. Ironically, the force of the law can
become tautological in this regard, to the extent that we equate legal and
moral precepts. Positivist perspectives that suggest that the force of law is
its own moral right may undermine the process of continual and ongoing
examination and assessment.
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moving picture. The voluntary code suggests both explicitly
and implicitly that it represents an amalgamation of current
thinking in a process that, while not necessarily infinite, has
no imminent end. A discussion may culminate in eventual
community enlightenment that converges upon a broad-based
consensus in which a universal truth is revealed, or discussion
may be eternal, because some issues cannot be solved by resort
to a universal truth.
Either way, the critical point is that a voluntary code can
be established to create an understanding that the moral
process has no immediate terminus. In contrast to the finite
quality of a true code, and its tendency to truncate the moral
conversation, a voluntary code may evoke a continuous
colloquy. Because no official disposition is desired or expected,
the conversation continues in an ongoing, steady stream.
From the viewpoint that identifies colloquy in the process of
community development as the ultimate source of ethics,"'
.. Legitimate and practicable ethical systems must be built upon a solid
community foundation. Both the quality and the broad popular acceptance
of value systems depend upon informed and intelligent discussion, which is
the foundation of community consensus. Colloquially derived value systems
both reflect and reinforce a defining characteristic of communities, namely
interdependence. For a discussion of the emphasis upon interdependence
in ethical systems that emphasize community, see JAMES O'TOOLE, THE
EXECUTIVE'S COMPASS: BuSINESS AND THE GOOD SOCIETY 88-89 (1993).
Communities, whether ascribed locally, as has been the case historically,
or globally, as is becoming more common in modern technological society,
participate in an iterative system in which interdependence is both the
source and the guiding characteristic of ethics. Interdependence inexorably
raises questions of ethics because our mutual proximity, and thus our
unavoidable interactions, pose challenges wherein the conflicting interests
and values will inevitably clash. Because of this reality, the solution to
ethical questions paradoxically mimics the problem itself. The difficulties
associated with interdependence, or with simply living together, are best
solved by extended conversation in which the disparate but proximate
interests are represented, and in which the interests to be furthered reflect
the unavoidable interrelatedness ofthe members of the relevant community.
These sentiments evoke the spirit of de Tocqueville's notion of "enlightened
self-interest," according to which communal cooperation is conceded in order
to advance the individual interests of all who participate in the cooperative
system. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA (Phillips
Bradley ed., 1945) (1835).
If interdependence is the driving force behind the existence of ethical
questions, the process for developing solutions, and the substance of the
solutions themselves, it becomes difficult to ignore the overwhelming role
of community in the evolution of any system of ethics. Community is a
process rather than an entity, such that legitimate and useful ethical
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systems should emphasize process over substance. From this standpoint,
a community's moral dimension is defined as the gradual and ongoing
creation of a common system or set of values.
Contrast this conception of ethics with one more commonly embraced by
those seeking to apply ethics in business and professional contexts. The
tempting desire for an immediate solution, with imminent and measurable
increments in what may be described vaguely as "more ethical behavior,"
drives the search for simplistic ethical mechanisms. Kipnis describes this
search as the application of an engineering model of applied ethics. See
Kenneth Kipnis, Ethics and the Professional Responsibility of Lawyers, 10
J. Bus. ETHIcS 569 (1991). Under this model, practitioners apply ethics by
reference to the more theoretical work of philosophers, as engineers apply
principles of physics. Id. at 570. As Kipnis observes, the analogy is flawed,
in part because what are broadly considered proved principles among
physicists become noncontroversial, whereas divergence always remains
among fundamental schools of philosophical thought. Id.
Philosophy is inherently different from physics in that it is not subject
to the same objective forms of proof characteristic of the scientific method.
This difference is particularly important in the process of trying to convert
theory to application in international and cross-cultural settings. As a
general principle, philosophies cannot be converted formulaically into
practices using the simple expedient of application. Uncontroverted and
uncontroversial scientific principles can be translated into workable
products and processes. In comparison, the challenging questions of applied
ethics, those at the margins of disagreement, cannot be so translated
because they are not subject to the rule of uncontroverted and
uncontroversial principles. The disparity between physics and philosophy
becomes exaggerated when questions of national sovereignty and cultural
variation are added to the equation. Philosophy is much more inherently
a cultural artifact than is physics, therefore applications of philosophy will
be much more culturally dependent than applications of physics. Likewise,
whereas the results of applied philosophy are largely intangible, the results
of applied physics are engineered products. The evaluation of philosophical
intangibles is likely to be more complex and controversial than the
evaluation of technological applications.
Taken together, the reasoning in this subsection suggests that ethics at
the margin can be conceived as equivalent to the development of community,
at least in its valuative aspect. Moreover, this process cannot effectively be
managed or engineered with formulaic facility, simply by applying a set of
rules derived from an underlying source of theory, such as the literature of
philosophy. This does not suggest that philosophy is not the ultimate source
of ethics, but rather that the transitions from theoretical philosophy to
applied ethics cannot be imposed in the legalistic embodiment of a code.
International ethics are derived in a painfully slow, evolutionary process-
the process of development of a global community.
Some critics may contend that the process is intolerably slow, and that
codification of controversial, marginal areas of ethics is necessary to ensure
the most humane conditions. In response to such challenge, a crucial point
must be emphasized: the absence of codified ethics is not the absence of
ethics. The conversation that results in attitudes that support behavioral
decisions comprises the developing body of international ethics as divergent
global cultures converge upon more shared understandings, in effect
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the voluntary code may be more valuable than a true code.
Precepts or principles that are not legally binding
nonetheless will be organically influential in the development
of community standards. For example, consider the ethical
challenges faced by MNCs doing business abroad with regard
to employment discrimination. Suppose that the Acme
Corporation does business in the country of Dystopia, where
the subjugation of women into subservient roles is universally
accepted as normal and desirable."1 Should the company
developing a global community, and hence a global ethics. The idea that
codification is necessary to avert unnecessary evil is presumptuous in its
assumption that the source of binding authority is capable of making the
most ethically sound decision at the margin, without the benefit of
conversation. This is not to suggest that ethics are relative, but rather that
potentially universal ethical precepts, upon which all parties may eventually
agree after examining all sides of the issues openly and disinterestedly, may
not be immediately accessible to the human race at this stage of our
development. A source of authority that adopts governing principles at the
margin, without adequate deference to the evolutionary process and the role
of colloquy in that process, evinces a form of ethnocentrism that threatens
both the quality of our developing ethical tenets and the likelihood that they
will receive broad constituent support.
Notwithstanding the risks associated with premature codification and
the concomitant end to colloquy, some commentators insist that
authoritative answers are necessary. Davis and Welton, for example,
suggest that individual discretion to evaluate good and bad is "unfortunate
because situation ethics have no place in either business or government
operations. A person needs to be able to separate ethical from unethical
situations without having to create a set of standards for every situation."
James R. Davis & Ralph E. Welton, Professional Ethics: Business Students'
Perceptions, 10 J. Bus. ETHICS 451, 454 (1991).
The idea that ethics should and must be fixed by a source of authority,
to such an extent that individuals need not analyze ethical situations as
they arise, both degrades the concept of ethics and creates opportunities for
mindless conformity to externally validated sources of control of varying
moral value. Encouraging individuals to distinguish good from bad signals
a richer conception of ethical processes than the fixed establishment of
ethical institutions.
11 While Dystopia is meant to be a fictitious nation, readers may be
tempted to identify a potential inspiration. The temptation is
understandable, given international discrepancies in racial and gender
equality, both in attitudes and behaviors. Japan in particular has received
poor marks for egalitarianism, in bothjournalistic and scholarly treatments.
See Yoshimi, Japan's Racial Myopia, 14 JAPAN ECHO 47 (1987); see also
Clayton Jones, Japan 7Ties to Shed Image Left by Racist Comments,
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 23, 1990, at 4; John Greenwald,
Prejudice and Black Sambo, TIME, Aug. 15, 1988, at 25; Paul Lansing &
Tamra Domeyer, Japan's Attempt at Internationalization and its Lack of
Sensitivity to Minority Issues, 22 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 135 (1991-92).
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purchase goodwill in Dystopia by refusing to hire and promote
women to positions of responsibility and authority, or should
the company stand by its egalitarian beliefs, hiring and
promoting on the basis of ability and merit? Are there other
options? Should the government dictate appropriate practices
for U.S. multinationals doing business in Dystopia?
While the country of Dystopia is mythical, the problems in
the hypothetical are real. In 1991 the U.S. Supreme Court
held that Title VII did not prohibit extraterritorial
discrimination against U.S. citizens by U.S. MNEs operating
outside of the United States."' As the holding was based on
an interpretation of Congressional intent under Title VII,"20
Congress responded in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by
specifically prohibiting Title VII discrimination by U.S. MNEs
against U.S. citizens abroad.' 2' The Civil Rights Act of 1991
exempts MNEs from Title VII's antidiscrimination provisions,
however, "if compliance.., would cause [an] employer.., to
violate the law of the foreign country in which [the] workplace
is located.""
Under a voluntary codification approach, respect for
community development as an organic process is paramount.
Accordingly, Congress should abstain from imposing
extraterritorial rule of U.S. values when those values are
controversial and in conflict with the values of the home
territory. Legislative restraint in these instances is neither
cowardly nor amoral. To the contrary, it liberates free
discourse, the most powerful tool for effecting social
change. 2 ' Specifically, egalitarian U.S. companies in the
"' EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 247 (1991).
'2 Id. at 248-256.
121 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, §109, 105 Stat. 1071,
1077-78 (1991).
m I& § 109(b)(1)(B).
', Compelling arguments can and should be made against gender
discrimination in any community. For example, Bellace observes that
"Ewith the internationalization of business, managers will increasingly seek
international experience. Lack of such experience may limit one's career
progress." Janice R. Bellace, The International Dimension of Title VII, 24
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 23 (1991). Overseas discrimination thus affects even
domestic career opportunities. Furthermore, as labor markets become more
global, reductions in demand for women's services in some parts of the world
are likely to have ripple effects in the remainder of the world under free
market conditions of supply and demand.
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hypothetical case can and should adopt some voluntary policy
option that embodies their ethical beliefs, and that has
persuasive force. Among these options, in increasing order of
severity, are: (a) the engagement in discussions aimed at
changing the attitudes of the host country, while adapting to
that country's normative system; (b) the unilateral adoption of
egalitarian policies, and the ongoing defense of those policies,
notwithstanding market pressures that encourage
discrimination; and (c) the refusal to participate in economic
transactions with nonegalitarian nations, in the form of a
boycott.
All three options are distinguished from U.S. legislation in
that they are private, technically noncompulsory decisions.
The options are only technically noncompulsory, because the
force of open colloquy may exact such pressure in an open
marketplace of ideas as to approach a de facto compulsion."'
Such pressures, fueled by the media, were the ultimate source
of expedited change in South African apartheid policies in the
early 1980s and 1990s."2 5
In both Dystopia and South Africa, encouragement of
colloquy in the process of developing an ethical community is
the ideal mode of moral evolution. Each of the three unilateral
voluntary options serves a vital and sustaining function in any
viable process of ethical reform: the internalization of, rather
than mere extrinsic imposition of, change. Each of the three
opinions shares a belief in, and commitment to, open and
honest persuasion in an ongoing conversation. Whether a
company merely elects to talk, opts to talk while taking an
ethical stand in its behavioral choices, or chooses to abstain
from participating, three critical characteristics apply: (1)
Each company must take responsibility for its own stance, and
124 For a discussion of the degree to which ideals of gender equality may
be developing in the global community, see Don Mayer & Anita Cava, Ethics
and the Gender Equality Dilemma for U.S. Multinationals, 12 J. Bus.
ETHICS 701, 706-07 (1993).
15 The case of South Africa does not provide a laboratory setting for
observing the pure impact of unilateral private pressures on global ethics,
because the U.S. government influenced individual corporate decisions
throughout the process. Nonetheless, the economic pressures placed on
South Africa to reform its policies of extreme discrimination under apartheid
were driven largely by public protest and concomitant pressure on private
industry and both public and private institutional investors.
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cannot ignore the problem by simply hiding behind the edict
of law. The problem of discrimination remains a critical
community concern, and is not relegated to the arena of issues
disposed by law. (2) Individual actors may disagree with the
party line. While public pressures favoring unilateral
sanctions are likely to remain and to be forceful, the open
conversation, and the insights and understanding that result
from that process, are not preempted by the dispository force
of authoritarian edict. (3) The decision to lodge ethical
responsibility in the marketplace rather than in the laws will
result in a process that, while more gradual, is likely to have
a solid and lasting effect. Whereas premature legal edicts may
force social change, often without accompanying changes in
attitude, more gradual colloquial pressures provide the
opportunity for real persuasion (i.e., for change to occur)
because internal support for the discriminatory system has
declined as beliefs have been altered.
This final observation returns to the basic precept of
ethical colloquy: that externally imposed moral positions
which lack internal cultural support will be less effective than
changes which reflect a substantive alteration of the culture
itself.12 Social change by edict not only short-circuits the
conversation, but also undermines the social and cultural
foundations that most effectively translate policy into practice.
There can be little doubt that laws prohibiting discrimination
in the United States are undermined daily by insidious and
carefully veiled discriminatory activity. Egalitarian policies
would be more effective if they were supported by more
widespread social consensus. Unfortunately, as the coercive
forces of public policy have impaired open, honest debate, they
have undermined discussion of the virtues of
... The debate between legal positivists and legal realists exists in part
because legislators fail to defer to individual self-determination prior to the
development of social consensus. This failure leads to error, in which rules
are legislated that later reveal themselves in the light of ongoing debate as
bad. Restraint in deference to social colloquy would provide a legal
reticence that averts both the rigidity of positivists and the free-handed
interpretation of laws by realists. For discussion of positivist and realist
perspectives on the interpretation of law, see Gregory C. Keating, Fidelity
to Pre-existing Law and the Legitimacy of Legal Decision, 69 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1, 16-21 (1993).
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egalitarianism.12  From a more theoretical perspective,
Talcott Parsons' classic explication of social systems explains,
among other things, the effects of informal normative
dynamics on human interactions. Parsons observes that a
number of system forces, or "modes of orientation," are
translated into moral and other action. 2 ' Parsons' modes of
orientation include various motives . . and values, 180 which
determine the ultimate character of actions. Varying patterns
of motives and values may determine, for example, whether
behavior is predominantly instrumental (i.e., geared toward
the efficient achievement of goals) or moral (i.e., concerned
with consummating good rather than bad behavior).'
Turner provides a succinct explanation of the interplay
between modes of orientation and types of action. He
emphasizes the potency of social systems of status, roles, and
norms that result from informal and organic human
intercourse:
[Tihe organization of unit acts into social systems
requires a parallel conceptualization of motives and
values that become, respectively, the personality and
cultural systems. The goal of action theory now
becomes understanding how institutionalized patterns
of interaction (the social system) are circumscribed by
complexes of values, beliefs, norms, and other ideas (the
cultural system) and by configurations of motives and
127 Open discussion regarding discrimination has been subverted by the
official party line, which has become so unassailable that most mildly
intelligent people know better than to produce for inspection retrogressive
attitudes which, while deeply felt, have become unacceptable in civilized
discourse. If we could open the conversation so that discriminatory
attitudes were exposed, they would be easier to change. In concealment
they simply fester and feed upon themselves. Those who hold racist and
sexist beliefs are most likely to be persuaded by arguments that they
perceive to be fair, honest, and open.
1
2
8 TALcoTT PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM 3-67 (1951).
'" Motives fall into three categories: cognitive (i.e., informational),
cathectic (i.e., emotional), and evaluative (i.e., seeking assessment). Id. at
7.
13 Values fall into three categories: cognitive (determining value based
on objective information), appreciative (determining value based on
aesthetics), and moral (determining value in terms of right and wrong). Id.
at 13.
131 Id at 49-50.
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role-playing skills (the personality system)."' 2
Parsons' organic functionalism can be translated for and
applied to the question of voluntary transnational codes.
While such provisional statements of emergent community
expectations are not technically binding, they influence
behavior. A voluntary code encompasses the transitional
status of values, beliefs, and norms. While the voluntary code
enhances characteristics of openness and mutability so as to
promote a healthy and balanced evolution, the existence of
voluntary codes at any given moment, albeit in evolving forms,
helps mold behavior via informal social and institutional
pressures. The voluntary code thereby has the potential to
balance the goals of community moral development with the
more pragmatic interests of viable social control, the latter of
which reflects received values, which are imperfect but ever
approaching perfection.
The process of developing and amending a voluntary code
is conversational in nature. Voluntary codes are not created
in vacuums, but rather by mutual adjustment and adaptation
that respond to a decisionmaking dialogue. In this sense, the
task of creating and maintaining a code formalizes the
conversation and ensures its continuation.
Given this role, voluntary codes are more appropriate
during the earlier, formative stages of community values,
whereas true codes are more viable and more acceptable
during later stages, once community values have congealed.
This observation reconciles the importance of a bottom-up,
democratic, diologic development of ethics with the necessity
for top-down, authoritarian implementation of true codes that
have been legitimized by extensive community evolution."'
In other words, while the pre-policy stage of moral consensus
development should be considered provisional and therefore
precatory, the post-policy stage is justifiably mandatory,'"
132 JONATHAN H. TURNER, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 63
(4th ed. 1986).
138 In response to the pragmatic need to enhance ethical behavior in
business and the professions, commentators often recognize the need for top
management to state their values and expectations clearly. See, e.g., Deon
Nel et al., Business Ethics: Defining the Twilight Zone, 8 J. Bus. ETHICS 781
(1989).
'" See id. at 781 ("The policies which an organization implements, with
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provided that the policy is legitimate, i.e., built on the
groundwork of an acceptable and adequate base of debate,
followed by consensus within the community.
The danger attendant to premature true codification, and
failure to use an intermediate voluntary codification stage to
debate, evaluate, and refine a policy is bimodal, operating at
both the individual and the community levels. Imagine that
a code that is suboptimal, from a hypothetical, highly
developed community standard, is prematurely promulgated as
a true and binding code. At the individual level, those who
conform to true code strictures in order to abide by the law
will have suspended individual judgment in deference to an
inferior policy; those who insist upon exercising free and
independent thought will face a dilemma3 5 associated with
the exercise of civil disobedience.' At the community level,
the aggregation of individual decisions-dysfunctional
decisions to abide by bad law, and inefficient decisions to
break bad law and thereby trigger the social expense of legal
enforcement mechanisms-is harmful. Even more crucially,
those who thoughtlessly conform to the premature true code
remove themselves from the debate of the substantive issues
associated with the code, mitigating the vigor of analysis and
thereby impeding or even halting the gradual development of
most optimal moral postulates as measured against extant
community values. Depicted graphically, we can observe the
transitional role of the voluntary code, as it reconciles the
conflicting needs of freedom and control during the formative
stage of community morality:
regard to ethically contentious issues in business, should ccnceivably also
be a reflection of the values of top management....").
1" This dilemma, of course, consists of the choice between abiding by a
law one believes to be immoral, or disobeying the law because one believes
it to be immoral.
"" Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict: The
Trouble With Law-Based Conceptions.of Ethics, 68 IND. L.J. 101, 105 (1992).
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Less Freedom
More Control
True Codes->Tendency to conform; tendency to terminate
debate.
Voluntary Codes->Moderated tendency to conform,
combined with encouragement of debate.
No Codes > Maximized freedom from coercion and
mindless conformity, but without any source of guidance to




As business becomes increasingly global, ethical
challenges are becoming increasingly complex. This article
analyzes this complexity and proposes a framework for the
development and implementation of international business
ethics. Specifically, it asserts the following propositions:
1. Ethical decision processes are directly linked to a number
of important substantive characteristics of the ethical decisions
themselves, including quality of the decision, degree of
appropriateness of the decision in the context of the particular
intercultural transaction or relationship involved, and viability
of the effective implementation of the decision.
2. This emphasis on process can be translated into a number
of supporting propositions regarding the adoption and use of
codes of ethics. Specifically,
A. True codes, i.e., codes that are binding by force of either
governmental or private authority, become increasingly
effective as they reflect higher levels of development of
intercultural community. Conversely, true codes are less
effective during the earlier stages of development of
intercultural community.
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B. Prior to viable true codification, an emphasis on ethical
decision processes suggests that colloquy should supplant
premature codification. At this early stage, legal clarity is
inappropriately restrictive, as the non-negotiable nature of
clear and precise edicts undermines and short-circuits the
continuing process of informal debate, from which legitimate
intercultural values can be derived. Support for colloquy,
rather than truncation of colloquy through the imposition of
legalistic mechanisms, can effectively help achieve
philosophical rather than legal clarity, i.e., force and clarity of
reason in the development of norms and values, rather than
force and clarity of language in enforcing extant values.
C. Premature true codification may be ineffective for a
number of ancillary reasons as well. Without consensus
achieved through debate and the refinement of ideas, true
codes tend to be vague. As a result, many premature true
codes are couched in only those bland terms and values that
can be widely accepted even at the early stages of intercultural
discourse. These relatively noncontroversial values tend to be
so broad and so fundamental as to provide little practical
guidance. Furthermore, premature codification can encourage
rebellion against high quality codes that are perceived to lack
legitimacy because fair processes have been subverted.
Premature codification can also yield entrenchment of low-
quality codes to the extent that the force of authority is
effective.
3. Community, ethical or otherwise, is as much a process as
it is a result. Emergent community values should therefore be
viewed and fostered with an emphasis on effective community
development processes. The interests of effective development
of global community values must be balanced with
countervailing interests of expediency in the development and
implementation of global ethics. An effective bridge between
the spheres of noncommunity and highly cohesive community
is the voluntary code, a hybrid that encourages the systematic
and concrete collection of proposed norms and values, without
the rigidity and chilling effect upon debate that tend to
accompany true codes. Voluntary codes can facilitate the
process of mutual adjustment necessary to the achievement of
confluence of separate normative systems as they meet in
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global market relationships and transactions.
The globalization of historically insular world forces is
occurring so rapidly in the wake of high technology as to create
a period of value crisis. The need for assimilation and
adjustment is greater than the time in which such processes
ordinarily occur. The transition to an ethical global
community will be facilitated by focusing on process rather
than true codification.
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